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Thesis Summary
Social Choice: Locating Public Facilities & Voting in a Large
Electorate
Swarnendu Chatterjee
September 5, 2017
1This thesis adds to the theory of social choice. As the name proposes, social choice
theory manages decisions of society. A decision of society may concern an extraordi-
nary assortment of things, for example, picking an area to put an open office, picking
candidates in an election and so forth. Presently, being normal each person in the
public eye needs the aggregate decision to be ideal for herself. Clearly, they express
unique preferences about the decision to be made. This makes an issue of amassing
these distinctive feelings or inclinations into a solitary social decision. The hidden
supposition is that individual inclinations are not known but rather everyone knows
the accessible decisions. Social choice theory models this accumulation of individ-
ual inclinations to an aggregate decision. A social decision capacity ought to have
“good” properties. Being good means distinctive things in various settings. A stand-
out amongst the most imperative properties is that no individual ought to have the
capacity to control the aggregate decision, making it ideal to her. This basically en-
sures each individual is “honestly” announcing her inclinations. Another alluring
property is that it considers every single individual inclination. Obviously there are a
few different properties thought to be attractive. The most vital inquiry is whether it
is conceivable to plan a social decision work that is sensible as in it fulfils a portion
of the properties.
In this regard, Arrow (1950), Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975) have shown that it
is generally impossible to find a social choice function satisfying all these desired cri-
teria. These results are called “impossibility results/theorems” in literature. However,
there are some remarks concerning the use of these results. Arrow has said, “Most
systems are not going to work badly all of the time. All I proved is that all can work
badly at times.” In his general impossibility result individuals are allowed to have any
conceivable preferences. There is a stream of literature showing that it is possible to
escape from “impossibility” if we do not assume the individuals to have all conceiv-
able preferences. Specifically, the possibility of having some positive results depends
mostly on two things, namely, the set of admissible preferences and properties of the
social choice function.
Two noteworthy methods for limiting the arrangement of allowable preferences are
considered in this proposition. One path is to limit the arrangement of preferences for
each individual to such an extent that every one of them have a similar arrangement
of permissible preferences from which they can pick autonomously. Another route is
to limit the preference blends of society all in all, as opposed to forcing limitations
over every person. In this theory we think about both these sorts of limitations. The
previous is examined in Part 1 and the last is contemplated in Part 2 of the Thesis.
2Part 1 of the theory elaborates on two area problems, to be specific, Locating an
open decent on a sphere and Locating two open products in R2. Part 2 investigations
several Voting strategies.
In chapter 2 the concern is how to locate a public good/bad on a sphere (the earth).
We assume that everyone wants the public good to be located at her most preferred
point on the sphere called the peak of her preference. For all other points the pref-
erence decreases with distance from the peak. Note that because of the Spherical
structure, a single-peaked preference can be reformulated as a single-dipped prefer-
ence. So, results based on single-peaked preferences translate to similar results on
single-dipped preferences. Therefore, this research applies to locating global public
goods for example global internet servers, storage for all human knowledge etc. Also
this work applies to locating global public obnoxious facilities like nuclear power
plants, scientific research projects involving nuclear reactions etc.We end up with an
“impossibility” result, which means that there is no non-dictatorial social choice rule
that satisfies the conditions we imposed. This result stands out in the stream of lit-
erature because usually having single-peaked preferences helps achieving possibility
results.
In chapter 3, we discuss the location of multiple public goods. Suppose we have to
locate two libraries in a town. It is natural to assume that agents prefer to have at
least one library close to their homes or some preferred place and preferences for all
other locations decrease with the distance from that most preferred locations. There-
fore, preference for a single library can be modelled as a single-peaked preference in
the two dimensional Euclidean space. As we are deciding on the location of two li-
braries together, we need to have joint preferences over pairs of locations. These joint
preferences are obtained by combining the marginal preferences for a single library.
There can be several different types of joint preferences, we use the so called lexmax
extension. Here we mainly study this location problem assuming the social choice
function to be “non-manipulable” and “uncompromising”. Under these conditions
we have been able to characterise the class of rules. Specifically, for each location we
apply a generalised median voter rule per coordinate.
In the final chapter 4, the issue is on anonymous collective decision making in large
electorates. We study frequency distributions over the set of preferences based on
the structure on linear orderings induced by the Kemeny distance. We show that at
the unimodal preference (frequency) distributions considered here many well-known
collective decision rules have the mode as outcome. We therefore consider it to be a
natural and appealing collective decision at such distributions. The results found here
indicate, that the mode choice of Condorcet consistent, Borda and Plurality rules is
3robust to considerable perturbations in the tail part of a single mode distribution. Our
analysis includes multimodal distributions resulting from superposing two or more
unimodal distributions.
